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Because of this, Haystack will be down from operations from May until August A smaller antenna, which is being used to test the W-band RF components, is producing images and will be available for limited operations during this time. It provides the most accurate tracking of any space surveillance radar. Radar development began in The radar was fielded in Norway in , making it 11 years old at IOC. Extended down-times for emergency maintenance are expected in the time frame.

The US needs to provide effective protection for space systems. The first step in doing this is to provide effective tactical and strategic situ-ational awareness. This is the most effective and efficient way to integrate a variety of sen-sors and other instruments on a broad set of satellites. SASSA will begin with a tech-nical demonstration and will proceed with methodical risk re-duction activities over the subsequent several years. It will produce an integrated set of flight hardware that will be operated on-orbit, providing a test bed to allow continued interface testing with new instruments.

The interface specification will be developed to enable future technology investments. It will establish policy for future space protection activities. SASSA will end with a finalized busi-ness strategy to guide future activities. An eventual SASSA acquisition program and beyond will encompass full-scale production of a standardized protection capability.

The goal is integrated on-board awareness and protection capabilities for all US space systems. As the foundation for space control, SSA encompasses intelligence on adversary space operations; surveillance of all space objects and activities; detailed reconnais-sance of specific space assets; monitoring space environmental conditions; monitoring cooperative space assets; and conducting integrated command, control, communications, processing, analysis, dissemination, and archiving activities.

Program Element F, Space Situational Awareness Operations, fields, upgrades, operates and maintains Air Force sensors and information integration capabilities within the SSA network while companion program element F, Space Situation Awareness Systems, develops new network sensors and improved information integration capabilities across the network. Activities funded in the SSA Operations program element focus on surveillance of objects in earth orbit to aid tasks including satellite tracking; space object identification; tracking and cataloging; satellite attack warning; notification of satellite flyovers to U.

Forces; space treaty monitoring; and technical intelligence gathering. The bombers can carry various modifications of the Kh, AS and Kh cruise mis-siles and gravity bombs. Russia operates two satellites of the new-generation early-warning system, EKS, and a network of early-warning radars. The satellite, Cosmos, is currently undergoing tests. Second spacecraft, Cosmos, was launched in May The early-warning satellites were transmitting information in real time to the Western command centers at Serpukhov, near Kurilovo, Kaluga oblast and Eastern center near Komsomolsk-on-Amur.

The information is processed there and transmitted to the command center in Solnechnogorsk. The main command center of the system and the battle-management radar are located in Sofri-no Moscow oblast. The command center of the system and its radar are undergoing a soft- ware upgrade. The system includes the Don-2N battle-management phased-array radar, command center, and 68 short-range interceptors of the 53T6 Gazelle type.

The 32 long-range 51T6 Gorgon interceptors have been removed from the system. The short-range interceptors are deployed at five sites -- Lytkarino 16 interceptors, Sofrino 12, Korolev 12 Skhodnya 16, and Vnukovo Long-range missiles used to be deployed with two units with headquart-ers in Naro-Fominsk and Sergiyev Posad The system was accepted for service in Space surveillanceSpace surveillance system is operated by the Main space-surveillance command center.

To monitor objects on low earth orbits and determines parameters of their orbits, the system uses the the early-warning radar network. The space surveillance network also includes the Krona system at Zelenchukskaya in the North Caucasus, which includes dedicated X-band space surveillance radars.

Another system of this type is being deployed near Nakhodka on the Far East. To monitor objects on high-altitude orbits, the space-surveillance system uses optical obser-vations. The main optical observation station, Okno, is located in Nurek, Tajikistan.

Its tele-scopes allow detection of object at altitudes of up to 40, km. The station began operat-ions in Space-surveillance tasks are also assigned to observatories of the Russian Aca-demy of Sciences. In addition, three radars--Baranovichi, Murmansk, and Pechora--have been "upgraded. Barnaul and Yeniseisk are Voronezh-DM. The radar in Baranovichi which is in Belarus is an old one-of-a-kind Volga radar.

The Daryal radar in Pechora is even older - it's one of the two original Daryal radars built in the s. Construction of new radar, probably of the Voronezh-VP kind, began there earlier this year. As we can see, the upgrade of the early-warning radar network has been a very successful program. The space segment of the early-warning system, in contrast, appears to be behind the schedule. It appears to be undergoing tests.

The new armament program calls for deployment of ten satellites of the EKS system by , but this plan does not seem particularly realistic. It should be noted, however, that for Russia the space-based segment of the early-warning system is not as as critical as for the United States, since it could never really rely on the "dual phenomenology" approach adopted by the United States. This is illustrated on this figure: It shows that in some scenarios SLBMs launched from the Atlantic, satellites don't add much to the warning time.

In any event, since Russia doesn't have forward-deployed radars, the radar warning comes to late to provide a useful check of the satellite informa-tion. To deal with the situation, the Soviet Union developed a different mechanism that allowed it to wait for signs of the actual attack such as nuclear explosions before launching its missiles. The arrangement is often referred to as the Dead Hand, since it does involve a certain predelegation of authority as well as the mechanism that ensures that decapitation does not prevent retaliation.

The system, however, is not automatic that idea was nixed in the s and requires humans to be involved in the decision to launch. Located in the Push- kino district of Moscow it is a quadrangular truncated pyramid 33 metres ft tall with sides metres ft long at the bottom, and 90 metres ft long at the top. Each of its four faces has an 18 metres 59 ft diameter Ultra high frequency band radar giving degree coverage.

The system is run by an Elbrus-2 supercomputer. It has a range of km for targets the size of a typical ICBM warhead. The first radar, in Lekhtusi near St Petersburg, became operational in There is a plan to replace older radars with the Voronezh by The Voronezh radars are described as highly prefabricated meaning that they have a set up time of months rather than years and need fewer personnel than previous generations. They are also modular so that a radar can be brought into partial operation whilst being incomplete.

At the launch of the Kaliningrad radar in November Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was quoted as saying "I expect that this step [the launch of the radar] will be seen by our partners as the first signal of our country's readiness to make an adequate response to the threats which the missile shield poses for our strategic nuclear forces. Nuclear weapons. Assured nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems safety, security, and control remain of paramount importance. Nuclear command and control safety and security also remain of paramount importance as stated in DoDD S Government communi-cations and information systems, which involves information security and cryptanalysis and cryptography.

NSA is a key com-ponent of the U. Intelligence Community, which is headed by the Director of National Intelligence. The Central Security Service is a co-located agency created to co-ordinate intelligence activities and co-operation between NSA and other U. Military cryptanalysis agencies. Information systems.

Assets, personnel and allies in Europe. It is flexible, initially using mobile radars and interceptors mounted on Aegis-equipped Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers. This new direction for European missile defense broke with the plans pursued by the Bush administration.

The Bush plans had called for deployment of a ground-based missile defen-se system in Europe, similar to the system deployed in California and Alaska. This included bilateral agreements to station ground-based interceptors in Poland and a radar installation in the Czech Republic. This represented "the first sustained deployment of a ballistic missile defense-capable ship" in support of the European PAA. The SM-3 IA succesfully intercepted a medium-range ballist missile target in its most recent test on February 13, Block IA has a single color seeker, a 21 inch-diameter booster, and is Block IA costs between 9 and 10 million per unit.

Sensors and Combat SystemInitially, the system will use sea-based sensors mounted on the Aegis ships, as well as a forward-based mobile X-band radar on land. The U. So far, seven have been produced, and two are currently deployed in Israel and Japan.

The sensors and interceptors will be brought together under the Aegis combat system. This is a system capable of tracking simultaneous targets. Phase 1 will primarily use Aegis version 3. Interceptors will also be mounted on an increasing number of Aegis BMD ships. In FY, the U. Navy plans to have 32 Aegis BMD ships. This interceptor differs from the Block IA in its "seeker" technology, consisting of a two color seeker, or "kill warhead," and improved optics.

The Block IB is estimated to cost between 12 and 15 million per unit. Sensors and Combat Systems In Phase 2, sensors will be integrated with updated versions of the Aegis combat system. This will supplement the deployments already underway at sea and in Romania and will extend coverage over a greater percentage of Europe. This new variant will be faster than Block I 4. These faster interceptors could potentially increase coverage to the whole European continent. The program is scheduled to begin flight testing in Improved seeker and optics will be included.

Aegis BMD ships are scheduled to be equipped with version 5. Was planned to have an improved seeker and a higher performance booster, with a velocity of According to the Defense Science Board , the SM-3 IIB's planned mission to intercept targets prior to the deployment of multiple warheads or penetration aids — known as "early intercept" — requires "Herculean effort and is not realistically achievable, even under the most optimistic set of deployment, sensor capability, and missile technology assumptions.

Category and DescriptionPresident George W. Bush announced Dec. As of February , the U. The United States also possesses 18 warships equipped with Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, a system intended to counter short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles as of January Developing and deploying ballistic missile defenses ranked high among the priorities of the George W. Bush administration..

The administration also aggressively sought foreign partners for the U. Still, the technology remains unproven. Intercept tests have involved substitute components in highly scripted scenarios. In thirteen tests, the Pentagon has hit a mock warhead eight times. In the most recent test, conducted on December 5, , the interceptor successfully destroyed the mock warhead; however, the incoming missile failed to deploy countermeasures meant to fool the interceptor into missing its target.

Pentagon officials acknowledge that the initial system will be rudimentary. But they argue that some defense is better than none at all. In addition, they assert that the only way to conduct more strenuous and realistic testing of the system is to deploy it.. For more than five decades, the United States has intermittently researched and worked on missile defenses. The planned deployment this fall will mark the second time that the United States has moved to deploy a defense against long-range ballistic missiles.

The first effort, Safeguard, was shut down within a few months of being declared operational in October because Congress concluded the defense was too expensive and ineffectual. Missile base located in North Dakota. The Bush administration inherited seven main missile defense programs, including the ground-based missile interceptor system and two related satellite programs. For the most part, the Bush administration continued work on these same programs, although it recast some, cut others, and added new projects.

It canceled one sea-based system—the Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System—and significantly down-sized a space-based laser initiative, while commencing new efforts to develop interceptors to attack multiple targets and to strike enemy missiles early in their flights. During the Clinton administration, Republicans repeatedly asserted that the development of working missile defenses was being hindered by a lack of political will, not scientific or engineering challenges.

However, several missile defense programs have fallen further behind schedule and suffered setbacks due to technical difficulties under the Bush administration. An aircraft designed to be armed with a powerful laser—known as the Airborne Laser—is now more than two years behind schedule and may be shelved. One of the two inherited satellite programs has been overhauled and renamed, while the other has far exceeded cost and schedule estimates.

In general, the Bush administration reorganized missile defense programs, placing all of them under one big tent the Missile Defense Agency rather than working on each one in isolation. Nevertheless, the Pentagon maintains individual program offices for each system, albeit with an eye toward sharing technology among the systems and exploring how they might operate together. In addition, the Pentagon is actively pushing to expand some of the earlier theater missile defense programs to try and tackle the strategic mission.

ICBMs travel farther, faster, and are more likely to employ countermeasures intended to fool defenses than shorter-range missiles. The ABM Treaty permitted the development of theater missile defense systems but prohibited work on nationwide strategic defenses. At this time, only the ground-based interceptor system has been tested against strategic ballistic missile targets, although the Pentagon has started to investigate whether some radars and sensors used in theater systems might also be capable of tracking a strategic ballistic missile.

Preliminary findings are encouraging, according to the Pentagon, which has declined to provide specific test results. The Obama administration has expressed general support for the idea of national missile defense, but indicated that some Bush-era programs may be up for review. Also included are Pentagon estimates on when each defense may have an initial, rudimentary capability as well as when it could be fully operational. Ballistic Missile BasicsBallistic missiles are powered by rockets initially but then they follow an unpowered, free-falling trajectory toward the target.

There are four general classifications of ballistic missiles:Short-range ballistic missiles, traveling less than 1, kilometers approximately milesMedium-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 1,—3, kilometers approximately , milesIntermediate-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 3,—5, kilometers approximately 1,, milesIntercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs, traveling more than 5, kilometersShort- and medium-range ballistic missiles are referred to as theater ballistic missiles, whereas ICBMs or long-range ballistic missiles are described as strategic ballistic missiles.

The ABM Treaty prohibited the development of nationwide strategic defenses, but permitted development of theater missile defenses. Ballistic missiles have three stages of flight:The boost phase begins at launch and lasts until the rocket engines stop firing and pushing the missile away from Earth.

Depending on the missile, this stage lasts between three and five minutes. During much of this time, the missile is traveling relatively slowly, although toward the end of this stage an ICBM can reach speeds of more than 24, kilometers per hour. The missile stays in one piece during this stage. The midcourse phase begins after the rockets finish firing and the missile is on a ballistic course toward its target.

During the early part of the midcourse stage, the missile is still ascending toward its apogee, while during the latter part it is descending toward Earth. This stage takes less than a minute for a strategic warhead, which can be traveling at speeds greater than 3, kilometers per hour.

Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles may not leave the atmosphere, have separating warheads, or be accompanied by decoys or other countermeasures. The EKV destroys its target by colliding with it. This process is referred to as hit-to-kill. StatusTo date, the system has had eight successful intercept attempts in twelve developmental tests. The most recent test, on Dec. Another 10 interceptors are to be deployed at FortGreely before the end of There are no plans to fire interceptors from FortGreely for testing purposes.

The interceptors under the Clinton plan were to have been supported by a land-based X-band radar, but the Bush administration also developed a sea-based X-band radar SBX. SBX was used on Dec. This radar, known as the Cobra Dane radar, is only be able to track missiles fired from the direction of Asia because the radar is fixed to face northwest.

MDA is also exploring the construction of a third missile defense site in Europe. The Bush administration signed a deal with Poland on August 20, , to place ten missile interceptors on Polish territory. The Bush administration also won the approval of the Czech government on April 3, , to build a tracking radar facility in the CzechRepublic. The United States is upgrading two foreign-based, early-warning radars to help track ballistic missiles launched from the direction of the Middle East.

Fylingdales has been upgraded and is operational, while the Thule-based radar will be integrated into the missile defense system by the end of fiscal year The SM-3 is a hit-to-kill missile comprised of a three-stage booster with a kill vehicle. The SM-3 is considered too slow to intercept a strategic ballistic missile.

Designed to CounterInitially, the Aegis BMD is geared toward defending against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their midcourse phase with an emphasis on the ascent stage. StatusThe system has a record of fourteen intercepts in eighteen flight tests. The two most recent tests, both in November , were failures. In a November 1 test, two target missiles and two interceptors were launched from Aegis-equipped destroyers in the Pacific Ocean.

One interceptor hit its target, but the other did not. In another test, on November 19, , the interceptor lost track of its target seconds before impact. Navy has eighteen ships outfitted with the Aegis BMD system. Sixteen of these ships are deployed in the Pacific Ocean, leaving two in the Atlantic.

Between and , the Navy hopes to build an Aegis force of 84 ships: 22 cruisers and 62 destroyers. The laser beam is produced by a chemical reaction. Designed to CounterAlthough the Pentagon originally aimed to field the ABL against theater ballistic missiles, the Pentagon now contends the ABL may have an inherent capability against strategic ballistic missiles as well.

The expanded ABL objective is to shoot down all ranges of ballistic missiles in their boost phase. The plane was not equipped with the laser. By , an ABL test plane had successfully tracked a target and hit it with a low-power laser. The target was not a ballistic missile, however, but was mounted on another aircraft.

Although Clinton administration plans first projected an ABL intercept attempt to take place in , development delays have led the Pentagon to push back such a test several times. It is now expected to take place in THAAD missiles are fired from a truck-mounted launcher. Intercepts could take place inside or outside the atmosphere. StatusThe system had two successful intercept attempts in the summer of after experiencing six test failures between April and March THAAD has tested successfully five times since being redesigned.

In two other tests the interceptor was not launched due to malfunctions of the target missiles. The missile is guided by an independent radar that sends its tracking data to the missile through a mobile engagement control station. StatusDuring earlier developmental testing, the system struck nine out of 10 targets. In four, more difficult operational tests between February and May that involved multiple interceptors and targets, seven PAC-3s were to be fired at five targets.

Of the seven PAC-3s, two destroyed their targets, one hit but did not destroy its target, one missed its target, and three others did not launch. PAC-3s destroyed two Iraqi short-range ballistic missiles during the conflict and shot down a U. Fighter jet. Earlier Patriot models also deployed to the region shot down nine Iraqi missiles and a British combat aircraft.

Missile defense systems by providing tracking data on missiles during their entire flight. Two satellites would provide little, if any, operational capability. The Pentagon estimates that at least 18 satellites would need to be deployed to provide coverage of key regions of concern.

Worldwide coverage could require up to 30 satellites. The program has cost at least 6 billion more than expected, and is several years behind schedule. Strategic Command in December The second sensor—HEO-2—is expected to come online in the first quarter of The booster is expected to travel at least six kilometers per second, which is comparable to an ICBM. The kill vehicle will not carry an explosive warhead but is designed to destroy its target through the force of a collision.

The Pentagon is developing mobile land- and sea-based versions of KEI, as well as fixed land-based units. Designed to CounterKEI is intended to destroy strategic ballistic missiles during their first minutes of flight when their rocket engines are still burning. StatusOn Dec. The Pentagon awarded the KEI contract several months after the independent American Physical Society released a study asserting that boost-phase intercepts would be technically possible under very limited circumstances.

The test was also the first to use remote tracking data; the radar used to track the target was forward-based hundreds of miles away instead of on the ship. Additional tests of the Block IB missile are ongoing. These tests will be conducted by the armed forces rather than by the Missile Defense Agency. The first operational test took take place in October ; the second will occur in FY Test 1 Oct. Arms control policy. Efforts on the part of this Administration to reaffirm the significance of the Treaty are described below.

In the Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that each may have two precisely limited ABM deployment areas later limited by mutual agreement to one: to protect its capital or to protect an ICBM launch area. To promote the objectives and implementation of the Treaty, the Parties established the Standing Consultative Commission SCC, which meets at least twice a year.

Also the terms of the Treaty specify that a review of the Treaty shall be conducted every five years. In , the Parties to the Treaty agreed by means of a Protocol to reduce the number of permitted ABM deployment areas to one for each side. The Administration therefore reaffirmed that the ABM Treaty prohibits the develop-ment, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components without regard to the technology utilized.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the question of treaty succession arose. At the same time, the growing threat posed by theater ballistic missiles, and the need to combine effective protection against such threats while avoiding development of an ABM capability, has prompted the U. The ABM Treaty itself does not provide clear guidance on this question. This clarification is being negotiated in the Treaty's imple-menting forum, the Standing Consultative Commission.

The United States was reassured during this review that other states shared the view of the Treaty's principal obligations and of the need to strengthen the Treaty. In the Joint Communique that was adopted at the Treaty Review, the partici-pating states concluded that: Commitment to the ABM Treaty was reaffirmed and it was agreed that maintaining the viability of the Treaty in view of political and technological changes remains important.

The delegations at the Review advocated continued efforts to strengthen the ABM Treaty The Standing Consultative Commission SCCIn the past, many issues related to theater and strategic defenses have been vigo-rously debated within a number of different fora, including the Standing Consultative Commission. At recent sessions of the SCC, which were held in Geneva from November 29 - December 17, , January 24 - February 4, , and March 21 - April 21, , the United States presented proposals designed to preserve the viability of the Treaty in light of the political and technological circumstances of the present day The other participating delegations have also introduced their own positions and ideas.

Despite some differences of view, the negotiations have demonstrated that there exists a significant degree of commonality in the approach to theater missile defense among SCC participants. There is general agreement 1 that the threat of ballistic missile proliferation is real; 2 that there is a shared interest in being able to defend against this threat; and 3 that the ABM Treaty must be clarified to allow for the field-ing of adequate theater missile defenses.

Commitment to the ABM Treaty. The Clinton Administration has reaffirmed the "narrow" or "traditional" interpretation of the ABM Treaty as the correct interpretation, i. The Administration has withdrawn the broad revisions to the Treaty previously pro-posed in the SCC which were intended to permit expanded deployment of strategic ABM defenses. When the Treaty was nego-tiated, both parties understood that this demarcation was left undefined.

The time has come to define it. This will be accomplished by agreement in the SCC, not unilaterally. How the final agreement is formalized, as a legal matter, must properly await the out-come of the negotiations. Finally, the President has directed the Administration to con-sult closely with Congress on these issues.

On July 13,, Thomas Graham, Jr. December U. And the result is pretty darn gloomy reading. For my own part I will also ad Norway. NATO today is not able to defend it's most vulnerable states! Please read the report yourself and make up your own opinion.

We must fight ISIS and terrorism in all it's uglyness. Keep your eyes and ears wide open and repport anything suspicious. As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members.

Across multiple plays of the game, Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours. After eastern Ukraine, the next most likely targets for an attempted Russian coercion are the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Like Ukraine, all three spent many years as component republics of the Soviet Union, gaining independence only on its dissolution.

The three are also contiguous to Russian territory. This storyline is disturbingly familiar. Unlike Ukraine, the Baltic states are members of NATO, which means that Russian aggression against them would trigger Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty —the collective defense provision according to which an at- tack against any signatory is considered to be an attack against all. This creates an obligation on the part of the United States and its alliance partners to be prepared to come to the assistance of the Baltic states, should Russia seek to actively and violently destabilize or out-and-out attack them.

And we will defend the territorial integrity of every single Ally. Because the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London. Article 5 is crystal clear: An attack on one is an attack on all. We will be here for Latvia. We will be here for Lithuania.

You lost your inde- pendence once before. With NATO, you will never lose it again. More than 20 allied divisions were stationed to defend that frontier, with many more plan- ned to flow in as reinforcements before and during any conflict see Figure 1. They are, however, defended only by the indigenous forces of the three Baltic states, which muster the rough equivalent of a light infantry brigade each. The distances in the theater also favor Russia.

From the border to Tallinn along the main highways is about km; depend- ing on the route, the highway versus crow-flight distance to Riga is between about and km. From the Polish border to Riga, on the other hand, is about km as the crow flies; to Tallinn, almost km. The terrain in the theater is a mix, with large open areas interspersed with forested regions; lakes; and, in some places, sizeable wetlands. Off-road mobility in parts of all three Baltic countries could be difficult, especially for wheeled vehicles.

There is, however, a fairly rob- ust network of roads and highways throughout, and there are few large rivers to serve as natural defensive lines and barriers to move- ment. Our analysis sought to account for the effects on movement and combat of this variability in terrain. Today, it can muster for operations in its Western Military District MD—the region adjacent to the Baltic states—about 22 battalions, roughly the same number of divi- sions forward deployed in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in These forces appear more than ade- quate, however, to overwhelm whatever defense the Baltic armies might be able to present.

The games employed Russian forces from the Western MD and the Kaliningrad oblast—a chunk of sovereign Russian territory that sits on the northeastern border of Pol- and, along the Baltic Sea coast—totaling approx- imately 27 maneuver battalions in a short-warning attack to occupy either Estonia and Latvia or both and present NATO with a rapid fait accompli.

The scenario assumed about a week of warning, which en- abled NATO to flow some reinforcements into the Baltics— mainly light infantry units that could be speed- ily air transported, along with airpower. Tables 1—4 list the forces with which both sides were credited at D-Day—when the hostilities began. The two sides adopted strategies that were generally similar across the games played. The Red players typically made a main effort toward the Latvian capital of Riga, with a secondary attack that quickly secured the predominantly ethnic Russian areas of northeast Estonia, and then proceeded toward Tallinn.

The outcome was, bluntly, a disaster for NATO. Four factors appeared to contribute most substantially to this result. Indeed, the only armor in the NATO force is the light armor in a single Stryker battalion, which is credited with having deployed from Germany during the crisis buildup prior to the conflict. NATO has no main battle tanks in the field. Even their eight airborne battalions are equipped with light armored vehicles, unlike their U.

Second, Russia also enjoys an overwhelming advantage in tactical and operational fires. The Russian order of battle includes ten artillery battalions. Each Russian brigade or regiment in the Western MD or Kaliningrad was assumed to be able to produce one deployable battalion tactical group for the attack.

This is consistent with the pattern observed in Russian Army operations in Ukraine. The majority of Russian ground forces in Kaliningrad were assumed to be held in reserve for defense of the enclave, and were not available for offensive operations; they are not listed in this table. Deployed from Aviano Air Base, Italy. We allowed some NATO combat aircraft to be based in Sweden, based on discussions with RAND colleagues who have had informal discussions with Swedish defense officials about scenarios similar to this one.

Analytically, this allowed us to explore the possible value of such arrangements. The relative abundance of bases available in Central and Western Europe, especially relative to the size of the deployed force, makes our results relatively insensitive to this assumption, although Swedish basing proved valuable insofar as it allowed NATO combat aircraft access to the battlespace that largely avoided the concentration of modern air defenses located in Kaliningrad.

The leaders and people of the Baltic states, who would need to decide whether to defend their capitals, would confront the first quandary. Quality light forces, like the U. Airborne infantry that the NATO players typically deployed into Riga and Tallinn, can put up stout resistance when dug into urban terrain. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high, as the residents of Grozny learned at the hands of the Russian Army in — Furthermore, these forces likely could not be resupplied or relieved before being over- whelmed.

The second and larger conundrum would be one for the U. President and the leaders of the other 27 NATO countries. Under the best of circumstances, this would require a fairly prolonged buildup that could stress the cohesion of the alliance and allow Russia opportunities to seek a political reso- lution that left it in possession of its conquests.

Even a successful counteroffensive would almost certainly be bloody and costly and would have political consequences that are unforeseeable in advance but could prove dramatic. Any counteroffensive would also be fraught with severe escalatory risks. If the Crimea experience can be taken as a precedent, Moscow could move rapidly to formally annex the occupied territories to Russia.

Finally, it is also unclear how Russia would react to a successful NATO counteroffensive that threatened to decimate the bulk of its armed forces along its western frontier; at what point would tactical defeat in the theater begin to appear like a strategic threat to Russia herself? The deterrent impact of such a threat draws power from the implicit risk of igniting an escalatory spiral that swiftly reaches the level of nuclear exchanges between the Russian and U.

Unfortunately, once deterrence has failed—which would clearly be the case once Russia had crossed the Rubicon of attacking NATO member states—that same risk would tend to greatly undermine its credibility, since it may seem highly unlikely to Moscow that the United States would be willing to exchange New York for Riga. Coupled with the general direction of U. The third possibility would be to concede, at least for the near to medium term, Russian control of the territory they had occupied.

The worst be would be the collapse of NATO itself and the crumbling of the cornerstone of Western security for almost 70 years. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high. Avoiding the fait accompli is valuable because it begins to present Russia with the risk of a conventional defeat and thereby is at least the beginning of a more credible deterrent. On the one hand, Russia today looks to its northwest and sees little between its forces and the Baltic Sea but highway and the prospect of forcing NATO into the three-sided corner described above.

Our goal was to devise a posture that would present an alternative landscape: one of a serious war with NATO, with all the dangers and uncertainties such an undertaking would entail, including the likelihood of ultimate defeat at the hands of an alliance that is mater- ially far wealthier and more powerful than Russia. Not all these forces would need to be forward stationed. Given even a week of warning, NATO should be able to deploy several brigades of light infantry to the Baltics.

Soldiers from the U. Army combat aviation assets rotationally based in Germany could self-deploy to provide some mobile antiarmor firepower, but by and large, these fast-arriving forces would be best suited to digging in to defend urban areas. In our games, the NATO players almost universally chose to employ them in that way in and immediately around Tallinn and Riga.

What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to more frequent and more-effective attacks from air and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks. Coming from the United States, such units would take, at best, several weeks to arrive, and the U.

Army currently has no heavy armor stationed in Europe. At the height of the Cold War, West Germany fielded three active corps of armored and mechanized units; today, its fleet of main battle tanks has shrunk from more than 2, to around The United Kingdom is planning on removing all its permanently stationed forces from Germany by ; currently, only one British brigade headquarters, that of the 20th Armoured Infantry, remains in continental Europe, and the British government is committed to its withdrawal as a cost-saving measure.

Combined arms battalion, the personnel for which would fly in and mate up with the prepositioned equipment of the European Activity Set stored in Grafenwoehr, Germany. Getting this unit into the fight is a complicated process that will not be instantaneous.

Breaking out the equipment—24 M-1 main battle tanks, 30 M-2 infantry fighting vehicles, assorted support vehicles—preparing it for movement, transporting it by rail across Poland, offloading it, and roadmarching it forward into the battle area are unlikely to take less than a week to 10 days. It is critical to emphasize that this relatively modest force is not sufficient to mount a forward defense of the Baltic states or to sustain a defense indefinitely. But it should eliminate the possibility of a quick Russian coup de main against the Baltic states, enhancing deter- rence of overt, opportunistic aggression.

There are several options for posturing the necessary heavy forces, each carrying different combinations of economic costs and political and military risks. For example, NATO could permanently station fully manned and equipped brigades forward in the Baltic states; could preposition the equipment in the Baltics, Poland, or Germany and plan to fly in the soldiers in the early stages of a crisis; could rely on rotational presence; or could employ some combination of these approaches.

The next phase of our analysis will explore a range of these options to begin assessing their relative strengths and weaknesses. It is also important to point out that, critical though they are, maneuver brigades are insufficient in and of themselves. Armor and infantry battalions must be adequately supported with artillery, air defense, logistics, and engineering. Over the past 15 years, the Army has reduced the amount of artillery organic to its divisions and has essentially stripped out all air defense artillery from its maneuver forces.

Further, there are presently no fires brigades in Europe able to augment the modest number of guns at the brigade and battalion level. This is in marked contrast to Russian tables of organization and equipment, which continue to feature substantial organic fires and air defense artillery, as well as numerous independent tube and rocket artillery and surface-to-air missile units. This disparity has had substantial impacts in our wargames.

Armor brigade combat team ABCT to fight what was in essence a covering force action to delay the advance of a major Russian thrust through Latvia. A critical element of such a tactic is the use of fires to cover the maneuver elements as they seek to disengage and move back to their next defensive position.

In this case, however, the ABCT was so thoroughly outgunned by the attacking Red force, which was supported by multiple battalions of tube and rocket artillery in addition to that of the battalion tactical groups themselves, that the battalion on one flank of the brigade was overwhelmed and destroyed as it sought to break contact, and the rest were forced to re- treat to avoid the same fate. The lack of air defenses in U.

Maneuver forces showed up in another game, in which two arriving NATO heavy brigades were organized into a counter- attack aimed at the flank of a Russian thrust toward Riga. The absence of short-range air defenses in the U. Units, and the minimal defenses in the other NATO units, meant that many of these attacks encountered resistance only from NATO combat air patrols, which were overwhelmed by sheer numbers. The result was heavy losses to several Blue battalions and the disruption of the counter- attack.

This highlights a critical finding from our analysis: A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U. Against an adversary, such as Russia, that poses multidimensional threats, airpower must be employed from the outset of hostilities to enable land operations, and land power must be leveraged to enable airpower.

Preventing a quick Russian victory in the Baltics would also require a NATO command structure able to plan and execute a complex, fast-moving, highly fluid air-land campaign. What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to morefrequent and more-effective attacks from air- and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks.

NATO corps that defended the inner German border during the Cold War each possessedadmittedly to different degrees in some cases, the ability to plan for and fight the forces they would command in wartime. Tactical and operational schemes of maneuver were developed and rehearsed; logistics support was planned; the reception, staging, and onward integration of reinforcing forces were laid out and, if never practiced in full, tested to an extent that lent confidence that procedures would work reasonably well when called upon.

Traditionally, the level of planning called for in the initial phase of the defense has been the province of a U. At the height of the Cold War, two Army corps under the operational command of 7th Army had planning responsibilities for Europe; today, none do. The Army should consider standing up a corps headquarters in Europe to take responsibility for the operational and support planning needed to prepare for and execute this complex combined arms campaign, as well as a division headquarters to orchestrate the initial tac- tical fight, to be joined by others as forces flow into Europe.

Today, the West confronts a Russia that has violently disrupted the post—Cold War European security order. Since the early s, the United States and its NATO partners have shaped their forces based on the belief that Europe had become an exporter of security, and for more than two decades that assumption held true.

Unfortunately, the usually unspoken accompanying assumption—that the West would see any disruption to that status quo coming far enough in advance to reposture itself to meet any challenge that might emerge—appears to have missed the mark. The first step to restoring a more-robust deterrent is probably to stop chipping away at the one that exists.

If NATO wishes to position itself to honor its collective security commitment to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, its members should first hit the pause button on further steps that reduce its ability to do so. While some ongoing actions may be too far advanced to stop, the United Kingdom and the United States should evaluate whether additional withdrawals of forces from Germany are wise, given the changed circumstances.

These measures need not be limited to strictly military ones. For example, one challenge NATO would face in the event of a Baltic crisis would be moving heavy equipment and supplies from storehouses and ports in Western Europe east to Pol- and and beyond. A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U.

Substantial investments may be necessary to facilitate these flows, investments that becau- se they also benefit the civilian economy— may prove more politically palatable than direct expenditures on troops and weapons. But troops and weapons are also needed, and it verg- es on disingenuous for a group of nations as wealthy as NATO to plead poverty as an excuse for not making the marginal investments necessary to field a force adequate at the very least to prevent the disaster of a Russian coup de main.

Army would not be inexpen- sive—the up-front costs for all the equipment for the brigades and associated artillery, air defense, and other enabling units runs on the order of 13 billion. However, much of that gear—especially the expensive Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles—already exists. Some is available due to recent cuts in Army force structure; there is also equipment in long-term storage, and some could be transferred from Reserve Component units, if needed.

So, although there may be some costs to procure, upgrade, or make serviceable existing equipment—as well as to transition units from one type to another—it is likely much less than 13 billion. The annual operating and support costs for three ABCTs plus enabling units—the price tag to own and operate the units—are roughly 2.

Aggressive acts, angry—even paranoid— rhetoric, and a moderate but real military buildup combine to signal a situation where it may be less than prudent to allow hope to substitute for strategy. It is instead due diligence that sends a message to Moscow of serious commitment and one of reassurance to all NATO members and to all U.

Allies and partners worldwide. Methodology and Data: The research documented in this report was conducted in a series of wargames conducted between the summer of and early spring Players included RAND analysts and both uniformed and civilian members of various Department of Defense organizations, including the U.

Army, U. Air Force, U. Navy, U. Marine Corps, Joint Staff, U. Army in Europe, and U. RAND developed this map-based tabletop exercise because existing models were ill-suited to represent the many unknowns and uncertainties surrounding a conventional military campaign in the Baltics, where low force-to-space ratios and relatively open terrain meant that maneuver between dispersed forces—rather than pushing and shoving between opposing units arrayed along a linear front—would likely be the dominant mode of combat.

Space Fence in Norway, but will it be to the best of the population who will be caught in the middle? Artwork by Petrofilm. The permit for the use of thermonuclear bombs of type B from Norwegian soil, owned and operated by the Americans, will be a guarantee for Norway, the management believes. Yes, it is a guarantee, but for the collective downfall of the Norwegian people. Norway has around 5. Only half of Norway's population is strong enough to take the first hours of the war. The rest of the population is elderly, sick, children, pregnant, in prisons and in miserable form.

Norway is a peacetime territory, but it is almost impossible to go to war. To that the country is too far, too cumbersome and too sparsely populated, and with a defense that is as good as defeated already. NATO started as a defense alliance but has become an attack alliance that has called in Russia and sees the country as its greatest enemy. Norway has hung on and gone from being a friendly neighbor to Russia, to becoming an offensive and provocative neighbor. This does not worry today's management in Norway.

But it should, because Norway's ability to save its population lies in a good relationship with the neighbor in the east. This view is good in theory, but is it wise to risk a global nu- clear melt down because of Tallin and Riga? The games employed Russian forces from the Western MD and the Kaliningrad oblast, a chunk of sovereign Russian territory that sits on the northeastern border of Poland, along the Baltic Sea coast, totaling 27 maneuver battalions in a short-warning attack to occupy either Estonia and Latvia or both and present NATO with a rapid fait accompli.

This view is good, in theory! But is it wise to risk a global nuclear meltdown because of Tallin, Riga and Vilnius? And I think I have Germany with me on this. Today, the situation is the reverse. These weapons, equipped with MK41 launchers, can be used for defensive missions air, land, sea, but also for offensive attacks with nuclear weapons.

Senator Dianne Feinstein said of these weapons: "The so-called improvements to this weapon seemed to be designed To make it more usable, to help us fight and win a limited nuclear war. The vast efforts we deployed in the 20th Centu- ry for war, must be mobilized today for peace and mutual development! Intention to deploy another armour brigade in Eastern Europe? Alexander Grushko: We need to see how these intentions play out. Presently, US forces are constantly rotated in six Eastern European countries and there are continuous exercises with the participation not only of US but also European contingents.

The naval grouping in the Baltic has been reinforced. Storage depots have been set up for equipment used by rotation units during joint exercises with national contingents. Troop reinforcement infrastructure continues to be upgraded. Military activity in the airspace along our borders has intensified. The number of reconnaissance flights has drastically increased.

There is constant talk about increasing the military presence in the Black Sea. This creates a long-term negative trend not only for regional security but also for European security as a whole. Another problem is that no one knows how far this process will go. It is becoming increasingly obvious that these military preparations have no basis in reality. There is no direct threat either to Poland or to the Baltic countries but the information campaign continues to gather momentum.

Absurd horror stories to the effect that Russia would have attacked the Baltic countries if NATO had not taken measures and deployed its troops in the region continue making the rounds. All indications point to a serious change for the worse in the military situation. We have stated more than once that continuous rotation does not differ in any way from constant deployment. I should point out, however, that two bases of the European segment of the global missile defence system are under construction.

The construction of the facility in Poland is in progress. Alexander Grushko: In no way. There is no collaboration. In April , NATO countries took the decision to halt all collaboration with Russia and all projects were put on hold. Today, we do not have a positive agenda with NATO. We often hear NATO representatives say they are ready for dialogue.

Dialogue through the permanent mission continues. We worked together on Afghanistan. We did a good deal of work in fighting terrorism not only in terms of threat assessment and sharing experience but also in implementing projects designed to rule out tragedies like the one in Brussels. Alexander Grushko: Formally, the council activity has not been halted. Upon our initiative, it was convened for an emergency meeting in June in connection with the start of a punitive operation by the Kiev authorities in southeastern Ukraine.

No meetings have been held since. Work is underway for the next meeting but no decision has been made yet. Alexander Grushko: The US military buildup is proceeding amid the erosion of the arms control regime in Europe. The CFE regime was the cornerstone of European security. It set ceilings on the main categories of weapon systems and ensured effective information-sharing and an intrusive verification regime.

In the early s, it became clear that the treaty did not measure up to the new political realities and adaptation talks began. It was more in sync with the new realities. In particular, it envisioned specific mechanisms of using political tools in case forces are deployed above the established quota limits. In , Russia ratified the treaty, but NATO countries dragged their feet on the ratification under contrived pretexts.

As a result, it did not come into effect. As the CFE Treaty has lost contact with reality, there is reason to say that the arms control regime in Europe is now dead. This further compounds the security situation. However, this choice was made by the NATO countries themselves. To others, it's just the day after Halloween -- a day they forget was once merely All Hallows Eve.

Some spend All Hallows recovering from the revelry of the night before, and some are still on the streets in the wee hours of the holy day. Our Case of the Week examines once such alleged citizen on the streets and the unfortunate lesson she learned about differing standards of legal review in a California appellate decision handed down last week.

Let's Make a DealAngelique Bongiovanni found herself in the legal system in , charged with possession of methamphetamine in two separate cases. In a deal that would come back to haunt her on the day after Halloween, she made a plea bargain in one of the cases.

Under the plea agreement, Ms. Bongiovanni pleaded no contest, and was placed on probation for three years. As an added bonus, her day jail sentence was suspended to run concurrently with the sentence from her other drug bust. It seemed like a good deal at the time, and it would have been All Hallows HijinksOn Nov.

Perhaps not unlike Chauncey and Wadsworth fighting over tee times, the proper procedure for shaking martinis, or the best way to train a polo pony, Ms. Diaz's neighborhood faced fights from the gentlemen and ladies of the rival gangs, "Vincent Town," and "Columbus Street. After taking her children trick-or-treating on Halloween evening, Ms. Diaz ventured outside at approximately in the morning of All Hallows to look for a friend parking on the street.

Instead, Ms. Diaz said she saw Ms. Bongiovanni accompanied by a companion in a pumpkin costume. According to Ms. Diaz, Ms. Bongiovanni proceeded to engage in an expletive-laden tirade of threats. To accommodate the gentle readers of Courtweek. Merci pour le jeu. On se fabrique tout, les patissiers vont leur travail par amour et je vois que vous le ressentez!!

A tres bientot sur Libourne!! Carine Lopez. Le tout dans mon quartier!!! Merci pour la piqure de rappel. Pour Elysse, je ne connaissais pas du tout. Un must. Une adresse gourmande. Note de la recette. Site web. En savoir plus. Contacter Anne Recevoir les articles par mail.

Votre adresse e-mail. On reste en contact! Cliquez ici si vous voulez en savoir plus sur moi. Chargement en cours Veuillez patienter Anne Lataillade. On reste en contact?

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Conforexpo, le Salon de l'habitat et des loisirs du 4 au 13 novembre — Parc des expositions de Bordeaux - Conforexpo, le Salon de l'habitat et des loisirs du 4 au 13 novembre — Parc des expositions de Bordeaux. Typo3 CMS. Coelho was arrested in the United Kingdom on Jan. Physician Partners of America to Pay Abraham Rivera, have agreed to pay The court also ordered the defendant to forfeit more than 2. Sanctions, and conspiring to commit visa fraud. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court is individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with the Rome Statute.

This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. UN Article 23 Right to Work Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. UN Article 21 Non-DiscriminationAny discrimination based on sex, race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic traits, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.

Through its harassments and deportation of the Norwegian Jews Norway has violated Nuremberg Principles VI, and specifically the Norwegian Police is guilty and was never brought to justice for these heinous crimes against humanity. An apology does not absolve guilt. Kohl was a German statesman who served as Chancellor of Germany from to and as the chairman of the Christian Democratic Union from to From to , Kohl was minister president of the state Rhineland-Palatinate.

Kohl chaired the Group of Seven in and again in It is a fact that Norwegian police and intelligence operatives work hand-in-glove with the United States Embassy in Oslo mining a huge amount of personal data from ordinary Norwegian citizens. Before criticizing codebreakers and journalists around the world, the United States should first scrutinize its own endeavors.

You can't live crooked and think straight, weather you're a chauffeur or a Chief of State! The Law applies equally to everyone. Norway has long been a close ally of the USA. Yet, those days would seem to be long gone, at least as far as the US is concerned, if a story recently revealed is to be believed. With revelations that U.

Embassies in Reykjavik and Helsinki, respectively, but spies on individuals from all U. The group operated from a building near the embassy, and collected information on hundreds of Norwegian citizens, whose details were added to a database called Security Incident Management Analysis System, SIMAS.

One nation that has adopted a sanguine reaction to the U. Surveillance activities in Scandinavia. The cooperation between the U. The Norwegian and Swedish governments have demanded answers to questions from U. Embassy in Oslo. On Monday when I asked you, you said that the Norwegian Government was aware of these activities.

They say they are not. Embassies, whether they are the embassies of other governments. So we have a program where we look carefully to make to evaluate if we believe our Embassy is under observation and potentially under threat. We share that information across the United States Government. But as appropriate, we share that information with our host government partners.

The essence of addressing this challenge which confronts the United States and other countries in the West is the very kind of intelligence cooperation and law enforcement cooperation that has been a hallmark of our alliances for a number of years. But everything that we do is fully consistent with our security arrangements that we have with any host nation government anywhere in the world, including Norway. At this point, I would just refer further questions back to our Embassy in Norway.

Embassy spying on civilians has been going on for the past 10 years, since Diplomatic Missions abroad all U. Embassies and consulates. SIMAS Reports typically contain a detailed narrative description of the suspicious activity prompting the report, available suspicious persons and vehicle descriptors, and other identification data as may be available e.

Reports also indicate date, time and location of suspicious activity, and may include amplifying comments from relevant Bureau offices. Even U. All types of information may not be collected on each specific group of individuals.

However, it may be possible for all forms of PII to be collected on an individual. Agencies have access to the data but so also do foreign nationals. Not anymore! Today we have "instant-detection-send-and-response" phased array-radars. They give us an even better, faster and more accurate situation report.

What took minutes before, take seconds and fraction of a second today. Space Fence is protecting our freedom in a much more reliable and sophistical way than before, and the best part it's here to stay! We thank the United States of America! Remain alert folks! Keep your eyes and ears open! Fight terrorism, domestic and foreign, at least in your spirit. Have a good day. Space Fence The Space Fence program is a new acquisition that will produce three world-wide-dispersed radar sites.

The radars will provide the ability to perform un-cued tracking of small objects at low and medium orbital altitudes. In , the Navy transferred the program to the Air Force. In the intervening years, the Air Force has refined the require-ments for the program to make the resulting radars more capable than a simple VHF Fence replacement. The program is in concept development, with an expected IOC for the first site of The radar is located in Vardo Norway.

It is one of five wide-band imaging radars in the SSN. These SLEPs include, but are not limited to, programs that extend the serviceable life of assets and maintain critical capability by replacing aging and increasingly unsustain- able components with modern equipment.

SLEPs may incorporate equipment which inher-ently includes technological advances resulting in enhanced or increased capabilities. In addition, the SLEP itself may be designed to increase certain capabilities. As the need arises in the execution year, funds in this project may be used to begin sensor life extension programs on additional efforts. While there, it observed several intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM flight tests a as well as two non-intercept tests of the kill vehicle for U.

A radar named Globus, had been operated since the s by Norway at Vardo, in cooperation with the U. Air Force, and was used to monitor Soviet and Russian ballistic missile flight tests. Outside observers have argued that Globus II is likely to be used to gather information on Russian ballistic missile tests, and that such information could be useful for ballistic missile defense. It is situated in a region of taiga, or flat terrain with boreal pine forests.

The warhead is said to successfully reach its target at Kura. Below Plesets Cosmodrome. Fish and Wildlife Service and is operated by the U. Air Force. It was a very unusual place. It is the only place I have ever heard of where one can experience heavy fog, tremendous winds, and snow, sleet, or rain all at once. We once endured a storm where the wind speed was measured at mph when the anemometer blew away.

I would not have traded my experience there for anything, although I did not appreciate it nearly as much then as I do now. Shemya Island has been developed by the military and continues to operate as an Intelligence Radar site whose principal purpose involves monitoring space and mis-sile activities.

Eareckson Air Station is an isolated self-contained military installation, and it has no surrounding communities. Established in May of as a forward operating base for long-range bomber aircraft of the US Army Air Force to conduct bombing missions on Japanese positions in the Kurile Islands, the base was heavily utilized until war's end, with the present-day runway being added to the airfield to support the operations a planned squadron of B Superfortresses flying missions ag-ainst mainland Japan as part of Operation Downfall.

Aegis warships capable of long-range surveillance and tracking and missile intercepts. Sea-based X-band radar now located in the Pacific Ocean to support flight testing and actual defensive operations. This data will cover the entire trajectory of the missiles, and will be of primal value to a U.

NMD system. Eareckson AS is located on the western tip of Alaska's Aleutian islands. The radar has the ability to detect objects about 2, miles away, and provides data for the Space Surveillance Network and the Ballistic Missile Defense System. Cobra Dane will continue to be operated by a contract workforce, and no military personnel will be assigned to the unit at Eareckson Air Station.

This northern-most region sweeps through Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia with its northern borders pointed directly towards the humongous Barents Sea. The region is the arctic part of the European Mainland Continent where it suddenly drops down in the ocean and disappears. This abrupt ending of mainland Europe into the ice cold and deep Barents Sea, is a dramatic confirmation of the geological processes that once have taken place here, and a stern reminder to us uber civilized souls that all things must come to an end.

Particularly during the winter months between November, December and January. At an angle of degrees, bearing West-North-East — lasting three hours maximum, before gray turned to pitch-black darkness again. And to be there and to experience it, is "to be on the Moon" — Gone are the modern metropolises in shining glass, towering concrete and beaming lights of all kinds, from all directions at the same time. Here, up north at the very edge of civilization, nature speaks directly to you - and you listen carefully!

And so it goes. From one stop northwards to the next stop. Snow falling, ship maneuvering slowly through sometimes shallow straits. The captains on these coastal ferries are themselves sons of captains, who also maneuvered these ships. Big sand banks outstretched beneath the hull move around, and the narrow passages above are maneuvered with maximum alertness. This is a spectacle to observe, not to argue with.

Traveling in the winter along the Norwegian coast is an investment in psychological awareness and depth, a unique chance to experience life in shades of gray and faint-color light. On 19th of October, a rainy city in Northern Russia welcomed travelers from all across the Barents countries and beyond. The historical city of Arkhangelsk once again had something to show to the world — a relationship of four nations and their cooperation remarkable to the people living in the North.

And the cold! Between till , wind not included. Bring a very thick winter coat! People along the coast come on board to look — invite you for coffee. They did with me! That is only in the winter when the ferry is half full, or one third full, depending. On board, the food is excellent, and when crossing the Polar Circle, you will be baptized with ice water in front of cheering dinner guests in the spacious dining room. And that water is freezing!

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and wife Becky are greeted by Air Force Lt. Dana T. The Pacific Regional Medical Center moved from Clark to Elmendorf and construction of a new, greatly expanded hospital began in In , the 21st Tactical Fighter Wing was reorganized as an objective wing and all the major tenant units on Elmendorf were placed under it. This was in keeping with the Air Force's polices of retaining the oldest and most illustrious units during a period of major force reductions.

It was also an alternative landing site for the Space Shuttle. Gates talks to U. Army Col. George Bond, Missile Defense Agency's top officer at the ground based interceptor missile facilities in Alaska, June 1, DoD photo by U. Air Force Master Sgt. Gates climbs down into a ground-based interceptor missile silo on Fort Greely, Alaska, June 1, Despite this you probably never heard of it nor the Army National Guard Soldiers who "pull the lanyard.

There is one system operated by the Army National Guard however, that dwarfs any of its nearest competitors. The GMD system is the ultimate "smart weapon. In order to do this the missile must reach an escape velocity of more than 6. This hypersonic speed is several times what a 7. To put it another way, it reaches a speed of approximately Mach From there, the EKV seeks out the target using multi-color sensors, a cutting-edge onboard computer, and a series of rocket motors used for independent steering in space.

The EKV homes in on its target with pinpoint accuracy and destroys it using nothing more than the force of a massive collision hit to kill without the need of a traditional warhead or explosives. It is like hitting a bullet with a bullet, but these bullets are launched thous- ands of miles apart and are moving at Mach It is ferociously complicated, but it works. Here's why. GMD is a "system of systems" involving shooters, sensors, and Command, Control and Communication systems.

Navy warships, and the massive sea-based X-band Radar. They are responsible for the strategic and tactical level execution of the GMD mission and provide security forces to defend the assets at Fort Greely, Alaska. The Soldiers of the th Missile Defense Brigade are part of a very unique multi-component organization. The th is tasked with conducting a presidentially-directed national security mission to defend the United States against the threat of ICBM attack. In order to perform their federal mission, all th MDB National Guard Soldiers ope-rate in a "dual status" allowing them to automatically transition between Title 10 fede-ral Active Duty and Title 32 National Guard status.

The Soldiers seamlessly transition between these two statuses depending on the duties they are performing or location. Cragon and Henry N. PetersonThis invention relates to control of a radar involving microwave modular an-tenna, and more particularly to digital phase shift control of a multielement phased array antenna.

This invention is particularly advantageous in connection with the construction and operation of airborne radar, but also has important application in ground based and ship based systems. With this invention, the radar may be operated in any one of the above modes or in several of such modes on a time-sharing basis. Airborne radar systems inherently have a problem of generating high power microwave energy and processing the transmitted and received signals while maintaining high reliability and minimum weight.

Major reliability problems in radars have been concerned with components such as rotary joints, servomotors for the antennas, and the like. Restrictions imposed by such components on reliability exist in the most contemporary transistorized radars. Further, the use of magnetrons for transmitting, klystrons for local oscillator service, and use of high power transmit-receive TR protection devices, all have been found to restrict the reliability of the system.

The present invention is directed to an improved radar which may employ solid-state circuitry so constructed that major obstacles heretofore encountered in the development of solid-state radar may be overcome. A solidstate functional electronic module has been developed for construction of a modular antenna array responsive to beam steering control disclosed in application Ser.

Cooke, et al. The Principle of Digital Phase shift 1. The combination set forth in claim 1 in which said first counter is a binary rate counter. The system of claim 1 wherein modulo generators are included in each output of said first counter. The system of claim 3 wherein each modulo generator includes means to introduce a present count therein with selected reset pulses applied thereto.

The method according to claim 7 wherein said first and second trains of pulses are produced simultaneously and wherein said first and second sets are employed sequentially. The method according to claim 7 wherein said first and second sets of pulses are each connected to modulo- and are thereafter sequentially applied to each said element. A system for dynamically controlling the directional character of at line of elements in a phased antenna which comprises:a separate selectively variable delay means in each of said elements through which radar signals must pass,b means for varying the effective lengths of said delay means,c a first counter having outputs of decreasing order and in number corresponding with the number of elements in said line,d a source of clock pulses,e means for applying said clock pulses to said first counter during a time gate proportional to the desired radiation angle of said line of elements, andf circuit means for transmitting pulses from the output of said counter to said means for varying with correspondence between the locations of elements in said line and the positions of outputs of said counter to vary the eliective lengths of said delay means.

Air Force identifies and tracks objects in space. Click and PlayBelow is an aerial view of the U. The flexibility and sensitivity of the system will provide coverage of deep space geosynchronous orbits while maintaining the survellance fence. Pic: Lockheed Martin. Click and PlayWith critical design review completed, the Space Fence team is focused on production of technology that will bring the system online. Space Fence will use Gallium Nitride GaN powered S-band ground-based radars to provide the Air Force with uncued detection, tracking and accurate measurement of space objects, primarily in low-earth orbit.

Lockheed Martin engineers and U. Air Force personnel are testing and training on a scaled-down version of the system in Moorestown NJ known as the Integration test Bed. The ITB provides the operational context to integrate and test end-item hardware and software prior to installation in the new Space Fence facility on Kwajalein. The locations and higher wave frequency of the new Space Fence radars will permit the detection of much smaller microsatellites and debris than current systems.

The flexibility and sensitivity of the system will provide coverage of deep space geosynchronous orbits while maintaining the surveillance fence. The radar is located in Eglin, Florida and thus sometimes referred to as the Eglin Radar at about Its construction began in , but it was destroyed by fire in before becoming fully operational.

It was rebuilt and began operations in The radar was originally intended only for space surveillance, but in it was also assigned a submarine-launched ballistic missile warning mission. This choice also facilitated simultaneously obtaining multiple narrow receive beams for more precise tracking and a broader transmit beam more suitable for surveillance.

Its center frequency is MHz, with a 10 MHz bandwidth. Its wavelength is thus about 0. The transmit antenna is uniformly illuminated and has a 1. Each of the 5, transmitter element is rated for a peak power of 10 kW and a 0. These give an array peak power of 52 MW and an average power of kW.

However, according to a paper the average power of individual elements individual elements varied from 2. The receive antenna is a tapered array with a diameter of 58 m containing 19, crossed dipole elements on a square grid, forming a circular aperture elements in diameter.

There are active receive modules. Its receive beam width is 0. The combined beam width is therefore 0. All nine receive beams are used in search, but only five in track. The FPS operates in time blocks called resource periods, each of which is 50 ms long. Its maximum bandwidth is 10 MHz. The pulse compression used to obtain greater better range resolution ratio may be as large as 1, OperationsThe FPS initially conducted surveillance using several different radar fences.

A software upgrade left the FPS with only relatively low-elevation radar fences, as the software needed for a higher-elevation fence intended for detecting lower RCS space objects was not funded. By integrating large numbers of pulses, the FPS is capable of tracking previously detected objects at least out to geosynchronous orbit range.

It is the only phased-array radar in the U. Space Surveillance Network capable of tracking objects in geosynchronous orbit the next two largest phased arrays are not oriented so as to be able to view geosynchronous orbit. The FPS assumed a deep space role in November after receiving a range-extension upgrade enabling integration of many pulses. The sensors are a conglomeration of capabil- ities mostly derived from and shared by other missions. Few of the sensors were developed for the express purpose of conducting space surveillance.

The Air Force has recognized that providing warfighters with effective Space Situational Awareness SSA requires a coordi-nated architecture-based approach to establishing and maintaining sensor capabilities. The satellite was built by a team made up of Boeing prime and Ball Aerospace space vehicle. The development and production contract provides for satellite design, fabrication, delivery, and launch, as well as ground station delivery and post-launch support.

SBSS will track objects primarily in deep space orbital period greater than minutes. However, SBSS will also have the capability to track objects with shorter periods, illumination permitting. The SBSS payload consists of a visible sensor assembly, a gimbal, and payload deck electronics. MIT Lincoln Laboratory is providing program management, integration, supervision of facility construction, and the telescope camera.

L-3 Integrated Optical Systems is building the telescope. In , the U. It will be a dedicated sensor in the U. The tele-scope is designed to find, fix, track, and characterize faint objects. It is the most dynamically agile telescope of its size ever built. It provides the first major technology push for deep space surveillance in over three decades.

The powerful device will be built in Exmouth as part of an agreement between Australia and the United States. It will contribute to the US global Space Surveillance Network, which provides warnings to all satellite operators of potential collisions with other satellites or debris. David Johnston, Defense Minister Australia The construction costs of the telescope will be shared and it will be located at the Harold Holt naval communications facility.

Defence Minister David Johnston says the telescope will focus on protecting satellites from space junk and will be operating in And here we are. Below is transcript of the radio talk with Defense Minister David Johnston. While the telescope will track asteroids and space debris, the Australian Defence Minister insists it will not be used for spying, despite having the ability to do so. The telescope has been moved to the Harold Holt naval communications facility at Exmouth. Here's AM's Caitlyn Gribbin.

Now, it's getting a space surveillance telescope. They came to us and we said well why don't we put it at Exmouth? And they said that's a good idea. The construction costs will be shared and the telescope, which will monitor space debris, will be operating in Those radio waves reflect off bits of space junk and the reflected waves are received by the telescope.

And the telescope basically tracks the space junk, predicts its orbit and is there to try and help prevent collisions between the space junk and satellites. Senator Johnston says it's in the national interest to build the telescope in WA. Do you have any concerns about that? I'm very much aware that this is for the general use of satellites that are largely civil in their output. It was a very short document. It was about the surveillance of space debris. It doesn't look at Earth.

It looks out from Earth into the outer atmosphere so that it's, you know, it's focused on things that are in the line of travel of satellites. So broadly speaking, it's in the same class of instruments but its specific purpose is to do radar for space junk. The telescope is still under construction. SST will see first light in late DARPA testing will occur in and It provides timely and accurate metric tracking and space object identification data.

Although primarily a near-Earth sensor, it is the only dedicated, high-capacity phased array radar with both near-Earth and deep-space capability. It is the primary tracker of low-inclination objects, and of objects that transit the manned-spaceflight regime. It has the capability to track most near-Earth objects once per day. This makes the operation of the FPS critical to the safety of manned space-flight. The SLEP will extend the operation of the radar until and will provide the ground work for future updates to the radar.

Haystack operates today at X-band, with one GHz of bandwidth. The upgrade will add the capability to operate at W-band with eight MHz of bandwidth. This will enable finer characterization of satellites, and characterization of smaller satellites than possible today. Operation at W-band requires replacement of the current Haystack antenna. Because of this, Haystack will be down from operations from May until August A smaller antenna, which is being used to test the W-band RF components, is producing images and will be available for limited operations during this time.

It provides the most accurate tracking of any space surveillance radar. Radar development began in The radar was fielded in Norway in , making it 11 years old at IOC. Extended down-times for emergency maintenance are expected in the time frame. The US needs to provide effective protection for space systems. The first step in doing this is to provide effective tactical and strategic situ-ational awareness.

This is the most effective and efficient way to integrate a variety of sen-sors and other instruments on a broad set of satellites. SASSA will begin with a tech-nical demonstration and will proceed with methodical risk re-duction activities over the subsequent several years. It will produce an integrated set of flight hardware that will be operated on-orbit, providing a test bed to allow continued interface testing with new instruments.

The interface specification will be developed to enable future technology investments. It will establish policy for future space protection activities. SASSA will end with a finalized busi-ness strategy to guide future activities.

An eventual SASSA acquisition program and beyond will encompass full-scale production of a standardized protection capability. The goal is integrated on-board awareness and protection capabilities for all US space systems. As the foundation for space control, SSA encompasses intelligence on adversary space operations; surveillance of all space objects and activities; detailed reconnais-sance of specific space assets; monitoring space environmental conditions; monitoring cooperative space assets; and conducting integrated command, control, communications, processing, analysis, dissemination, and archiving activities.

Program Element F, Space Situational Awareness Operations, fields, upgrades, operates and maintains Air Force sensors and information integration capabilities within the SSA network while companion program element F, Space Situation Awareness Systems, develops new network sensors and improved information integration capabilities across the network.

Activities funded in the SSA Operations program element focus on surveillance of objects in earth orbit to aid tasks including satellite tracking; space object identification; tracking and cataloging; satellite attack warning; notification of satellite flyovers to U.

Forces; space treaty monitoring; and technical intelligence gathering. The bombers can carry various modifications of the Kh, AS and Kh cruise mis-siles and gravity bombs. Russia operates two satellites of the new-generation early-warning system, EKS, and a network of early-warning radars.

The satellite, Cosmos, is currently undergoing tests. Second spacecraft, Cosmos, was launched in May The early-warning satellites were transmitting information in real time to the Western command centers at Serpukhov, near Kurilovo, Kaluga oblast and Eastern center near Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The information is processed there and transmitted to the command center in Solnechnogorsk.

The main command center of the system and the battle-management radar are located in Sofri-no Moscow oblast. The command center of the system and its radar are undergoing a soft- ware upgrade. The system includes the Don-2N battle-management phased-array radar, command center, and 68 short-range interceptors of the 53T6 Gazelle type.

The 32 long-range 51T6 Gorgon interceptors have been removed from the system. The short-range interceptors are deployed at five sites -- Lytkarino 16 interceptors, Sofrino 12, Korolev 12 Skhodnya 16, and Vnukovo Long-range missiles used to be deployed with two units with headquart-ers in Naro-Fominsk and Sergiyev Posad The system was accepted for service in Space surveillanceSpace surveillance system is operated by the Main space-surveillance command center.

To monitor objects on low earth orbits and determines parameters of their orbits, the system uses the the early-warning radar network. The space surveillance network also includes the Krona system at Zelenchukskaya in the North Caucasus, which includes dedicated X-band space surveillance radars.

Another system of this type is being deployed near Nakhodka on the Far East. To monitor objects on high-altitude orbits, the space-surveillance system uses optical obser-vations. The main optical observation station, Okno, is located in Nurek, Tajikistan. Its tele-scopes allow detection of object at altitudes of up to 40, km. The station began operat-ions in Space-surveillance tasks are also assigned to observatories of the Russian Aca-demy of Sciences.

In addition, three radars--Baranovichi, Murmansk, and Pechora--have been "upgraded. Barnaul and Yeniseisk are Voronezh-DM. The radar in Baranovichi which is in Belarus is an old one-of-a-kind Volga radar. The Daryal radar in Pechora is even older - it's one of the two original Daryal radars built in the s. Construction of new radar, probably of the Voronezh-VP kind, began there earlier this year. As we can see, the upgrade of the early-warning radar network has been a very successful program.

The space segment of the early-warning system, in contrast, appears to be behind the schedule. It appears to be undergoing tests. The new armament program calls for deployment of ten satellites of the EKS system by , but this plan does not seem particularly realistic. It should be noted, however, that for Russia the space-based segment of the early-warning system is not as as critical as for the United States, since it could never really rely on the "dual phenomenology" approach adopted by the United States.

This is illustrated on this figure: It shows that in some scenarios SLBMs launched from the Atlantic, satellites don't add much to the warning time. In any event, since Russia doesn't have forward-deployed radars, the radar warning comes to late to provide a useful check of the satellite informa-tion.

To deal with the situation, the Soviet Union developed a different mechanism that allowed it to wait for signs of the actual attack such as nuclear explosions before launching its missiles. The arrangement is often referred to as the Dead Hand, since it does involve a certain predelegation of authority as well as the mechanism that ensures that decapitation does not prevent retaliation. The system, however, is not automatic that idea was nixed in the s and requires humans to be involved in the decision to launch.

Located in the Push- kino district of Moscow it is a quadrangular truncated pyramid 33 metres ft tall with sides metres ft long at the bottom, and 90 metres ft long at the top. Each of its four faces has an 18 metres 59 ft diameter Ultra high frequency band radar giving degree coverage. The system is run by an Elbrus-2 supercomputer.

It has a range of km for targets the size of a typical ICBM warhead. The first radar, in Lekhtusi near St Petersburg, became operational in There is a plan to replace older radars with the Voronezh by The Voronezh radars are described as highly prefabricated meaning that they have a set up time of months rather than years and need fewer personnel than previous generations.

They are also modular so that a radar can be brought into partial operation whilst being incomplete. At the launch of the Kaliningrad radar in November Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was quoted as saying "I expect that this step [the launch of the radar] will be seen by our partners as the first signal of our country's readiness to make an adequate response to the threats which the missile shield poses for our strategic nuclear forces.

Nuclear weapons. Assured nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems safety, security, and control remain of paramount importance. Nuclear command and control safety and security also remain of paramount importance as stated in DoDD S Government communi-cations and information systems, which involves information security and cryptanalysis and cryptography.

NSA is a key com-ponent of the U. Intelligence Community, which is headed by the Director of National Intelligence. The Central Security Service is a co-located agency created to co-ordinate intelligence activities and co-operation between NSA and other U. Military cryptanalysis agencies. Information systems. Assets, personnel and allies in Europe. It is flexible, initially using mobile radars and interceptors mounted on Aegis-equipped Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers.

This new direction for European missile defense broke with the plans pursued by the Bush administration. The Bush plans had called for deployment of a ground-based missile defen-se system in Europe, similar to the system deployed in California and Alaska.

This included bilateral agreements to station ground-based interceptors in Poland and a radar installation in the Czech Republic. This represented "the first sustained deployment of a ballistic missile defense-capable ship" in support of the European PAA. The SM-3 IA succesfully intercepted a medium-range ballist missile target in its most recent test on February 13, Block IA has a single color seeker, a 21 inch-diameter booster, and is Block IA costs between 9 and 10 million per unit.

Sensors and Combat SystemInitially, the system will use sea-based sensors mounted on the Aegis ships, as well as a forward-based mobile X-band radar on land. The U. So far, seven have been produced, and two are currently deployed in Israel and Japan. The sensors and interceptors will be brought together under the Aegis combat system.

This is a system capable of tracking simultaneous targets. Phase 1 will primarily use Aegis version 3. Interceptors will also be mounted on an increasing number of Aegis BMD ships. In FY, the U. Navy plans to have 32 Aegis BMD ships.

This interceptor differs from the Block IA in its "seeker" technology, consisting of a two color seeker, or "kill warhead," and improved optics. The Block IB is estimated to cost between 12 and 15 million per unit. Sensors and Combat Systems In Phase 2, sensors will be integrated with updated versions of the Aegis combat system. This will supplement the deployments already underway at sea and in Romania and will extend coverage over a greater percentage of Europe.

This new variant will be faster than Block I 4. These faster interceptors could potentially increase coverage to the whole European continent. The program is scheduled to begin flight testing in Improved seeker and optics will be included. Aegis BMD ships are scheduled to be equipped with version 5. Was planned to have an improved seeker and a higher performance booster, with a velocity of According to the Defense Science Board , the SM-3 IIB's planned mission to intercept targets prior to the deployment of multiple warheads or penetration aids — known as "early intercept" — requires "Herculean effort and is not realistically achievable, even under the most optimistic set of deployment, sensor capability, and missile technology assumptions.

Category and DescriptionPresident George W. Bush announced Dec. As of February , the U. The United States also possesses 18 warships equipped with Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, a system intended to counter short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles as of January Developing and deploying ballistic missile defenses ranked high among the priorities of the George W.

Bush administration.. The administration also aggressively sought foreign partners for the U. Still, the technology remains unproven. Intercept tests have involved substitute components in highly scripted scenarios. In thirteen tests, the Pentagon has hit a mock warhead eight times. In the most recent test, conducted on December 5, , the interceptor successfully destroyed the mock warhead; however, the incoming missile failed to deploy countermeasures meant to fool the interceptor into missing its target.

Pentagon officials acknowledge that the initial system will be rudimentary. But they argue that some defense is better than none at all. In addition, they assert that the only way to conduct more strenuous and realistic testing of the system is to deploy it.. For more than five decades, the United States has intermittently researched and worked on missile defenses. The planned deployment this fall will mark the second time that the United States has moved to deploy a defense against long-range ballistic missiles.

The first effort, Safeguard, was shut down within a few months of being declared operational in October because Congress concluded the defense was too expensive and ineffectual. Missile base located in North Dakota. The Bush administration inherited seven main missile defense programs, including the ground-based missile interceptor system and two related satellite programs.

For the most part, the Bush administration continued work on these same programs, although it recast some, cut others, and added new projects. It canceled one sea-based system—the Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System—and significantly down-sized a space-based laser initiative, while commencing new efforts to develop interceptors to attack multiple targets and to strike enemy missiles early in their flights.

During the Clinton administration, Republicans repeatedly asserted that the development of working missile defenses was being hindered by a lack of political will, not scientific or engineering challenges. However, several missile defense programs have fallen further behind schedule and suffered setbacks due to technical difficulties under the Bush administration. An aircraft designed to be armed with a powerful laser—known as the Airborne Laser—is now more than two years behind schedule and may be shelved.

One of the two inherited satellite programs has been overhauled and renamed, while the other has far exceeded cost and schedule estimates. In general, the Bush administration reorganized missile defense programs, placing all of them under one big tent the Missile Defense Agency rather than working on each one in isolation.

Nevertheless, the Pentagon maintains individual program offices for each system, albeit with an eye toward sharing technology among the systems and exploring how they might operate together. In addition, the Pentagon is actively pushing to expand some of the earlier theater missile defense programs to try and tackle the strategic mission. ICBMs travel farther, faster, and are more likely to employ countermeasures intended to fool defenses than shorter-range missiles.

The ABM Treaty permitted the development of theater missile defense systems but prohibited work on nationwide strategic defenses. At this time, only the ground-based interceptor system has been tested against strategic ballistic missile targets, although the Pentagon has started to investigate whether some radars and sensors used in theater systems might also be capable of tracking a strategic ballistic missile.

Preliminary findings are encouraging, according to the Pentagon, which has declined to provide specific test results. The Obama administration has expressed general support for the idea of national missile defense, but indicated that some Bush-era programs may be up for review. Also included are Pentagon estimates on when each defense may have an initial, rudimentary capability as well as when it could be fully operational.

Ballistic Missile BasicsBallistic missiles are powered by rockets initially but then they follow an unpowered, free-falling trajectory toward the target. There are four general classifications of ballistic missiles:Short-range ballistic missiles, traveling less than 1, kilometers approximately milesMedium-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 1,—3, kilometers approximately , milesIntermediate-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 3,—5, kilometers approximately 1,, milesIntercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs, traveling more than 5, kilometersShort- and medium-range ballistic missiles are referred to as theater ballistic missiles, whereas ICBMs or long-range ballistic missiles are described as strategic ballistic missiles.

The ABM Treaty prohibited the development of nationwide strategic defenses, but permitted development of theater missile defenses. Ballistic missiles have three stages of flight:The boost phase begins at launch and lasts until the rocket engines stop firing and pushing the missile away from Earth.

Depending on the missile, this stage lasts between three and five minutes. During much of this time, the missile is traveling relatively slowly, although toward the end of this stage an ICBM can reach speeds of more than 24, kilometers per hour.

The missile stays in one piece during this stage. The midcourse phase begins after the rockets finish firing and the missile is on a ballistic course toward its target. During the early part of the midcourse stage, the missile is still ascending toward its apogee, while during the latter part it is descending toward Earth.

This stage takes less than a minute for a strategic warhead, which can be traveling at speeds greater than 3, kilometers per hour. Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles may not leave the atmosphere, have separating warheads, or be accompanied by decoys or other countermeasures. The EKV destroys its target by colliding with it. This process is referred to as hit-to-kill. StatusTo date, the system has had eight successful intercept attempts in twelve developmental tests.

The most recent test, on Dec. Another 10 interceptors are to be deployed at FortGreely before the end of There are no plans to fire interceptors from FortGreely for testing purposes. The interceptors under the Clinton plan were to have been supported by a land-based X-band radar, but the Bush administration also developed a sea-based X-band radar SBX. SBX was used on Dec. This radar, known as the Cobra Dane radar, is only be able to track missiles fired from the direction of Asia because the radar is fixed to face northwest.

MDA is also exploring the construction of a third missile defense site in Europe. The Bush administration signed a deal with Poland on August 20, , to place ten missile interceptors on Polish territory. The Bush administration also won the approval of the Czech government on April 3, , to build a tracking radar facility in the CzechRepublic.

The United States is upgrading two foreign-based, early-warning radars to help track ballistic missiles launched from the direction of the Middle East. Fylingdales has been upgraded and is operational, while the Thule-based radar will be integrated into the missile defense system by the end of fiscal year The SM-3 is a hit-to-kill missile comprised of a three-stage booster with a kill vehicle. The SM-3 is considered too slow to intercept a strategic ballistic missile.

Designed to CounterInitially, the Aegis BMD is geared toward defending against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their midcourse phase with an emphasis on the ascent stage. StatusThe system has a record of fourteen intercepts in eighteen flight tests.

The two most recent tests, both in November , were failures. In a November 1 test, two target missiles and two interceptors were launched from Aegis-equipped destroyers in the Pacific Ocean. One interceptor hit its target, but the other did not. In another test, on November 19, , the interceptor lost track of its target seconds before impact. Navy has eighteen ships outfitted with the Aegis BMD system.

Sixteen of these ships are deployed in the Pacific Ocean, leaving two in the Atlantic. Between and , the Navy hopes to build an Aegis force of 84 ships: 22 cruisers and 62 destroyers. The laser beam is produced by a chemical reaction.

Designed to CounterAlthough the Pentagon originally aimed to field the ABL against theater ballistic missiles, the Pentagon now contends the ABL may have an inherent capability against strategic ballistic missiles as well. The expanded ABL objective is to shoot down all ranges of ballistic missiles in their boost phase.

The plane was not equipped with the laser. By , an ABL test plane had successfully tracked a target and hit it with a low-power laser. The target was not a ballistic missile, however, but was mounted on another aircraft. Although Clinton administration plans first projected an ABL intercept attempt to take place in , development delays have led the Pentagon to push back such a test several times.

It is now expected to take place in THAAD missiles are fired from a truck-mounted launcher. Intercepts could take place inside or outside the atmosphere. StatusThe system had two successful intercept attempts in the summer of after experiencing six test failures between April and March THAAD has tested successfully five times since being redesigned. In two other tests the interceptor was not launched due to malfunctions of the target missiles.

The missile is guided by an independent radar that sends its tracking data to the missile through a mobile engagement control station. StatusDuring earlier developmental testing, the system struck nine out of 10 targets. In four, more difficult operational tests between February and May that involved multiple interceptors and targets, seven PAC-3s were to be fired at five targets. Of the seven PAC-3s, two destroyed their targets, one hit but did not destroy its target, one missed its target, and three others did not launch.

PAC-3s destroyed two Iraqi short-range ballistic missiles during the conflict and shot down a U. Fighter jet. Earlier Patriot models also deployed to the region shot down nine Iraqi missiles and a British combat aircraft. Missile defense systems by providing tracking data on missiles during their entire flight.

Two satellites would provide little, if any, operational capability. The Pentagon estimates that at least 18 satellites would need to be deployed to provide coverage of key regions of concern. Worldwide coverage could require up to 30 satellites. The program has cost at least 6 billion more than expected, and is several years behind schedule. Strategic Command in December The second sensor—HEO-2—is expected to come online in the first quarter of The booster is expected to travel at least six kilometers per second, which is comparable to an ICBM.

The kill vehicle will not carry an explosive warhead but is designed to destroy its target through the force of a collision. The Pentagon is developing mobile land- and sea-based versions of KEI, as well as fixed land-based units. Designed to CounterKEI is intended to destroy strategic ballistic missiles during their first minutes of flight when their rocket engines are still burning.

StatusOn Dec. The Pentagon awarded the KEI contract several months after the independent American Physical Society released a study asserting that boost-phase intercepts would be technically possible under very limited circumstances. The test was also the first to use remote tracking data; the radar used to track the target was forward-based hundreds of miles away instead of on the ship.

Additional tests of the Block IB missile are ongoing. These tests will be conducted by the armed forces rather than by the Missile Defense Agency. The first operational test took take place in October ; the second will occur in FY Une adresse gourmande. Note de la recette. Site web.

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